THE CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ABORTION CONTROVERSY: STAGES IN THE ARGUMENT

Celeste Condit Railsback

MOST AMERICANS are tired of hearing about the painful and apparently irresolvable issue of abortion. They feel that they have heard all the arguments, have seen all the ghastly pictures, and have been offered no happy answers. The current public debate about abortion seems to be stalemated, but this is a relatively recent stage in the controversy. A tracing of arguments about abortion during the crucial decades of the sixties and seventies shows major changes in the public arguments used to discuss the topic. The controversy has evolved through seven identifiable stages, from emotional narrative to squabbling implementation and stalemate.

A close examination of these stages accomplishes several objectives. It helps to explain how and why the current American assessments of abortion have come to be as they are. It also fills research gaps cited by Robert S. Cathcart, James R. Andrews, and Leland Griffin, because it provides a “social movement” study that is detailed, that focuses on language strategies rather than on events and actors, and that takes into account the interaction between “movement” and “counter-movement,” rather than viewing a movement in isolation. Finally, the study also provides more general hypotheses about patterns of rhetoric in the process of social change.

Prelude—Professional Arguments

When the argument over abortion became public in the early sixties, it was not the first time. In the 19th century, a similar violent and vigorous argument over abortion had raged. This argument was settled when the various state legislatures outlawed almost all abortions. Gradually, a dominant ideology solidified which held that abortion constituted the taking of human life and was an assault on the primary social values of “family” and “motherhood.” As described by Barbara Plant, however, that settlement did not provide a congenial solution for all, and it produced small-scale, but persistent resistance. Advocates in the sixties made little reference to these earlier arguments. Indeed, most of them seemed oblivious to the existence of such argumentation.

Of more direct importance to the eventual formulation of the public argument in the sixties were the abortion arguments in the professional fields that occurred in the fifties. Professionals gave focus to the early public arguments and also recruited abortion reform advocates—many from the ranks of the physicians. Thus, the first stage of the contemporary American abortion controversy was the professional stage.

The professional debate appeared in scholarly forums. The controversy involved

Dr. Railsback is an Assistant Professor of Speech Communication, Tulane University. The author wishes to thank Professors Bruce E. Gronbeck, Michael Calvin McGee, and John R. Lyne for their help with the dissertation upon which this essay is based, University of Iowa, 1982.
psychiatrists, doctors, social workers, population analysts, and lawyers who were faced with ever-increasing tensions because their roles required them to provide assistance of various kinds to women who desired abortions and who often sought illegal abortions. The issues of their arguments were narrow and related primarily to the specific concerns of the various professions. For example, one of the first "solutions" to the abortion "problem" was the decision among physicians to create hospital committees to decide which women could have "legal" abortions. This solution eased only the emotional burden felt by individual physicians. The growing pressures that had led professionals to experience a "problem" with abortion, however, soon led nonprofessionals to similar experiences. Once nonprofessionals became involved, the professionally oriented and limited issues were rapidly found to be inadequate; they did not cover the full range of concerns in vocabulary appropriate to the public.

**The Early Sixties**

Public argument in the early sixties centered on legal reforms and consisted largely of the retelling of the tale of illegal abortion. The second stage of the argument, therefore, was dominated by a narrative form. The tale consisted of powerful descriptions of the traumas many women faced when having illegal abortions. In these mini-dramas, the rhetors described the agents, purposes, scenes, and agencies in "typical" illegal abortions.

The women in these dramatic horror stories were depicted quite sympathetically. For example, Marguerite Clark referred to the "wan nervous girl [who] could see only one way out of her dilemma." Later, Sherri Finkbine, who had unknowingly taken thalidomide and had gone to Sweden to abort a deformed fetus, was portrayed as "a healthy and happily married Arizona woman, mother of four" and host of *Romper Room*.

The reasons cited for these abortions were also dramatic. The women were emotionally ill, they had been raped, they carried deformed fetuses, or they were young girls of fourteen or fifteen who had been seduced by older men (even their fathers) and had been deserted. Even the stories that cited socio-economic reasons portrayed the most drastic possible cases of destitution—women who were "unwilling and unable to face a future with another mouth to feed."

The portrayals of the means used in these illegal abortions were often ghastly. In contrast to references to "safe and simple" legal operations in which the doctor simply "scraps the products of conception out of the uterus," the articles graphically detailed the instruments of illegal abortions. One author indicated that the "bizarre items doctors have found include turkey quills, knitting needles, hairpins, rattle combs, plastic bottles and even elastic bandages," as well as "the most favored 'instrument' of the amateur"—"a straightened out wire coat hanger inserted into a catheter" used for a "pack job."

Recountings of these instruments were often accompanied by gory descriptions of the techniques of an entire abortion. One story of a young woman, who had an engineering student abort her, told that he bought an ordinary flashlight, removed the batteries and cut the bottom off with a can opener. He used the flashlight as a speculum . . . through this "speculum" he pushed a catheter into which he had threaded a wire. He then forced air through the contraption,
which, unknown to him, had penetrated a blood vessel in the girl's womb. An air bubble entered the blood stream and in seconds reached her brain. Today this young woman is totally paralyzed.\textsuperscript{19}

Other grisly methods—falling down stairs or injecting caustic soap solutions into the womb—were also frequently described, and the most shocking details possible were included. One such story told of an abortionist who thought he did not have all the fetal matter out and ended up pulling out a woman's intestines.\textsuperscript{20} These horrific descriptions of the methods used in illegal abortions added great impact to the emotional rejection of illegal abortion sought by the Pro-reform authors.

As Kenneth Burke has noted, the container and the thing contained must suit each other, and in this case, the arguers generally provided a suitable scene for the grotesque operations.\textsuperscript{21} The “back alley” became the common term for the illegal abortion scene, but detailed depictions of dirty kitchens (some even with photographs) or back car seats were also plentiful in this period.\textsuperscript{22} In addition, the involvement of the “underworld” was related in stories of women who met strangers on street corners or in front of sleazy hotels, to be blindfolded and driven to temporary, hidden destinations. Direct references to other “rackets,” such as prostitution and gambling, were also included.\textsuperscript{23}

Restatements of such stories aroused strong emotion, but they did not present a case for the desirability of abortion, only for the undesirability of illegal abortion.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, the audience, as well as many of the advocates themselves, believed that abortion was murder and a challenge both to God and patriarchal authority.\textsuperscript{25} Consequently, activists urged only that abortions be permitted in limited and extreme circumstances. When five states modified their laws in the mid-sixties, the reforms reflected these limitations: abortions were legalized in the special cases of rape, incest, fetal deformity, or threat to the pregnant woman’s physical or mental health.\textsuperscript{26}

Resistance to these changes can be discovered in anti-reform arguments, which were infrequent. In contrast to the Pro-reform argument, which would eventually go through several significant ideographic shifts, the anti-legalization argument remained focused on one ideograph throughout—“life.” Pro-life advocates stated simply that abortion was the taking of life, and hence all abortions had to remain illegal.\textsuperscript{27} Pro-life advocates also argued for positive alternatives to abortion, such as adoptions or more rigid sexual standards.\textsuperscript{28} This strategy allowed the dominant ideology to maintain its key values intact, while still responding to the tale of illegal abortion.

Thus, in the early sixties, the argument about abortion did not present a direct challenge to the prevailing beliefs about abortion, family, and motherhood. Instead, through an emotionally powerful narrative, it argued for minor concessions for extreme circumstances. Advocates of the dominant ideology answered that such exceptions could not be made because they would amount to murder. Both sides gained many adherents, but the Pro-reform side gained ground, because, for the first time in roughly a century, legal abortions were sanctioned in situations beyond the protection of the pregnant woman’s life.

**THE LATE SIXTIES**

It was unlikely that the abortion argument would rest at this point, however. Advocates of reform had, intentionally or not, made a forceful emotional claim
against the horrors of all illegal abortions. If knitting needles and back alleys were repugnant for "good women with good reasons," they were also gruesome for women with more "selfish" purposes. Moreover, the increased expectations of access to abortions outran the increased availability of abortions. Few additional abortions were performed under the new laws. More central perhaps, the continued repetition of the tale of illegal abortion, and the Pro-life advocates’ response to it, put a great deal of pressure on the narrative. If there were contradictions in the ideology and social conditions the tale bridged, the narrative would reveal them. The contradictions disclosed by the tale were many.

The most blatant inconsistencies appear in the depictions of the agents involved—both the women having abortions and the men (frequently) performing the abortions. On the one hand, the women so vividly and fully characterized as aborters were generally young, single "victims." On the other hand, the pro-reform advocates noted in passing that illegal abortion really affected married women more frequently: "not the wanton teenager . . . not the naive girl in the big city . . . but the young (between 21 and 25 years) married woman is most likely to undergo an abortion," they warned.

A Pro-reform article might describe two or three "typical cases" of young victims, often having already declared that such cases were not typical at all.

This contradiction arose because of the need to appeal to two ideological components. In the first instance, the tale worked best to generate sympathy within the "old" ideology if it told of the unfortunates who, through no fault of their own, were forced into an abortion. The entrenched ideology held that the only women who should have sex were those who were married, and if sex in marriage resulted in pregnancy, then every wife would want to carry through that pregnancy to enact or reenact the joys of motherhood. Women were held generally responsible for their pregnancies and only youth, rape, or catastrophe could excuse them.

Despite the rhetorical strength of this tale of illegal abortion, the motivating forces that led to many illegal abortions were quite different—the desire or economic need to control one's family, life style, and status through abortion. Yet, because the women's liberation ideology had not been fully and publicly articulated, there were no salient arguments readily available to express the need or desire for abortion as a demand, and no advocates expressed the political "rights" of women. Therefore, until the late sixties, the reality remained incongruously juxtaposed against the tale built by the arguers.

A contradiction also existed in the descriptions of the abortions. On the one hand, abortions were described as "hacks" and "incompetents." They were men who lead disorganized lives—numerous divorces, alcoholism, drifting from job to job and place to place. Police sometimes find pornographic literature in their possession. Sometimes abortionists have sexual relations with their patients before aborting them.

However, the reformers emphasized that, in fact, "90% of all the illegal abortions are performed by physicians using sterile procedures." Sympathetic portraits described "a genial, graying family doctor who had served them [the community] for thirty years . . . founder of the Grove Public Library, former city councilman and the PTA's choice for Father of the Year in 1960." This contradiction arose from two sources. At the surface level, two different
arguments for liberalizing abortion laws conflicted. The fear of disease and death from illegal abortion was a major impetus for reform, and painting a dirty and incompetent abortionist was necessary to generate that fear. Simultaneously, however, to placate the reigning ideology, advocates wished to argue that changing abortion laws would not bring about a change in the moral climate, and would not lead to more abortions. Therefore, they argued that legal changes would only legalize existing practices; illegal operations already conducted by physicians would merely become legal.

More importantly, there was a dramatic difference between the types of abortionists available to different classes. Upper middle class women were often able to get safe abortions from competent physicians. They had long been travelling to Cuba, Mexico, and Puerto Rico for abortions that might not have been completely legal, but that were fairly routine. More frequently, perhaps, their close contact with a private physician allowed them to get abortions at home as well. Poorer women turned to the abortionist quack.

Again, however, the ideological structure that would allow the clear expression of this discrepancy was not firmly in place in the early sixties. It was not until the later sixties that the term “discrimination” became general enough to be applied to abortion and the third stage of the argument, the ideographic stage, occurred.

By the late sixties, the Civil Rights movement’s key terms—“freedom,” “equality” (or “discrimination”), and “rights”—had gained strong salience. The broad exposure and general acceptance of these terms provided a way to explain publicly the contradictions in the tale of illegal abortion. The ideographs sorted out the confusion between tales of married and single women, competent physicians and incompetent hacks, by arguing that illegal abortion resulted from “discrimination.” Affluent, married women were able to flaunt the poorly enforced law and gain safe abortions from well-qualified doctors. Their abortions constituted the statistics. The horror stories were created by the poor, single women who received “hatchet jobs” from untrained criminals. The poor were being treated “unequally” and their “rights” violated. The heightened salience of the ideographs thus allowed advocates to do more than lament the sad stories of illegal abortion; the ideographs allowed the expression of a legal and social demand.

This shift from narrative toward ideographic argument also required that a new policy be offered. If existing laws were objectionable because they caused discrimination, the inequity could not be remedied by changes in laws to allow a few of the more pitiful abortions, but only by elimination of the entire discriminatory system. Instead of arguing for reform laws, the new demand was for repeal of virtually all abortion laws.

During the late sixties, arguments about abortion also became tied with another growing “discrimination” issue, that of women’s rights in general. If women were “free to choose” not to have children, their lifestyles would be quite different than if their only role was as “mother.” Consequently, “control of our own bodies” began in this period to become a major claim about “rights” in support of legalization of all abortions. This line was not yet firmly instantiated as an ideographic argument for “choice,” but clearly the foundations of that claim were laid at this point.

The appearance of this argument was the first major challenge to the dominant ideology. Although the auxiliary ideograph “discrimination” made total legalization of abortion necessary, that argument still worked within the key value terms of the
status quo (e.g. "equality"). In contrast, the claim for "control of our own bodies," and the consequent implied repudiation of the role of "motherhood," would, in the seventies, come to represent a major challenge to the dominant ideology, which portrayed woman's highest (and virtually sole) calling as that of bearing children.\(^{47}\) That break would generate the feminist stage of the argument and result in the key ideograph of the movement—"choice."

One final argument was of major importance in the late sixties—concern about "the unwanted child."\(^{48}\) Before the 1960's, advocates had used eugenic arguments to condemn abortion. Eugenicists had argued that abortion led to the decrease of the upper classes and the increase of the lower classes.\(^{49}\) This argument was reversed in a benign form in the "no unwanted children" argument in the later 1960's. Especially in 1967, Pro-reform advocates contended that unwanted children were a serious social problem. They linked unwanted children to delinquency and the cycle of poverty and child abuse. Abortion, they argued, was preferable to bearing a child who would be unwanted, for the sake both of the child and the society.\(^{50}\)

The late sixties thus saw major shifts from narrative based argument to ideographic argument, from a reform argument to a repeal argument, and from an argument based on the dominant ideology to a feminist argument which would challenge the dominant ideology.

**The Early Seventies**

Some temporary legislative successes for the advocates of repeal signalled that America at least was tempted by these new arguments to endorse legalized abortion and to accept a more tolerant general understanding of abortion.\(^{51}\) New York, for example, legalized virtually all abortions in 1970, and the number of abortions performed there sky-rocketed.\(^{52}\) The success of the reform laws and the resultant demand for repeal, however, were correlated with other changes as well. Reform advocacy was not conducted in a vacuum, and during this period there were major changes in the argument against legalized abortion which were advanced by those who called themselves "Pro-life." Those opposed to liberal abortion laws consistently had argued from the dominant ideology that the fetus must be protected as a human life.\(^{53}\) In the late sixties they seemed to realize that the ideograph "life" was not protecting the fetus because the public did not unconditionally characterize a fetus as a human life. Then, and increasingly in the early seventies, they began to mobilize and to advance strong arguments linking the fetus and "life."

Several material grounds were available to establish this discursive link. First, scientific references to genetic development were frequently cited.\(^{54}\) Second, the distribution of photographs of fetuses seemed to have the effect of representing the fetus as human.\(^{55}\) Third, the liberalizing of abortion laws by some states added highly visible, material grounds for this linkage; there were a few highly-publicized late-term abortions where the fetus struggled to survive for a pathetically short period. These added force to characterizations of the fetus as human.\(^{56}\) Finally, reform and repeal laws allowed massive numbers of legal abortions for wide-ranging purposes in the repeal states.\(^{57}\) These conditions were widely successful in challenging the Pro-reform narrative, which had suggested that women sought abortions only for "good" reasons.

Overall, the reaffirmation of the fetus as human seemed to make great headway in
undermining the “choice” ideology. Both a strong voter reaction and a shift in tone in the popular magazines signalled rejection of repeal laws in 1971 and 1972.58

Meanwhile, the rationale for supporting legal abortion was also evolving. The focus on “discrimination” led to a belief in the “right” to abortion. This belief interacted with the earlier depictions of illegal abortions to produce a new ideographic argument. A combination of the ideograph “right” and the narrative depiction of the disastrous consequences of a lack of “choice” resulted in the generation of the ideograph “choice.” The term gradually gained strength from the late sixties into the mid-seventies.59 It was not until the seventies, however, that the “Pro-choice” argument became dominant and replaced the ideograph “discrimination.”

Development of this fourth stage of the argument was tightly interwoven with the rise of the feminist movement. The abortion controversy both fueled the development of the feminist ideology and fed on feminism’s development. The ideograph “choice” had particularly important implications for the woman’s role in the traditional family. It was a crucial factor in the right to select non-traditional lifestyles for women. The right to choice and new concepts of “family” eventually were accepted by many.60 It was at this fourth stage, the feminist stage, that the argument from the legal arena impinged on the public controversy.

In its January 1973 ruling on Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court avoided resolving the issues in the abortion controversy at an ideographic level.61 The Court accepted the Pro-choice characterization of motherhood as an occasionally negative state, accepted the Pro-life characterization of the fetus as human potential, but it rejected both the claim to absolute choice and the claim for the absolute humanity of the fetus.62 Although the policy implications outlined by the Court were more extreme than any the public consciousness might then have felt comfortable with, the general characterization of abortion as an occasionally necessary, if distasteful, element of community and legal life was quite consistent with the evolving popular opinion, according to the polls.63

Pro-life reaction to this decision was virulent. Pro-life advocates always had characterized legalized abortion as a journey down a “slippery slope” to destruction.64 When the Supreme Court rendered its decision on Roe v. Wade, the lamentations were vehement. At that point, the Pro-life advocates believed that they had established undeniably the full humanity of the fetus. Therefore, they viewed the Supreme Court’s ruling not as a rejection of the humanity of the fetus, but as a rejection of the principle of human life in general. Such a rejection produced a major reaction, apocalyptic in tone.65 Legal abortion was now a fact, however, and that made a major difference in the discussion of abortion in the public arena.

THE MID-SEVENTIES

The fifth stage of the debate, the normalization struggle, was characterized by two competing tendencies: (1) attempts to normalize abortion by working it into the daily understandings of Americans and (2) an escalation of the opposition to such normalization, focusing on a constitutional amendment. In addition to relatively minor issues, such as the propriety of television portrayals of abortion, fetal research, and the beliefs of church members, the major questions of fetal viability and funding for abortions provided the battle grounds for this struggle.66
The fetal viability issue was pointed up by the manslaughter trial of Dr. Kenneth Edelin. This sensational trial, arising from Edelin's performance of an abortion by hysterotomy, revealed the inadequacies of the Supreme Court's decision; in actual cases, "choice" and "life" were brought into bloody conflict. But the Court had not ranked one ideograph over the other; consequently, public understanding of abortion remained confused. Individuals such as Marla Pitchford and Drs. Edelin and William Waddill were caught in these definitional conflicts.67

The issue of public funding of abortions was equally tortuous. At the narrative level, public funding of abortions was as desirable for preventing back alley abortions as had been legalizing abortions in the first place. However, on this issue the Pro-choice advocates faced their own ideology as a limiting condition. Disputants who opposed public funding of abortions used the Pro-choice group's own ideograph, "choice," as an argument against requiring those who believed abortion to be immoral to pay for abortions through their taxes.68 Congressional adoption of the Hyde Amendment, which cut off most federal funds for abortions, the Court's support of that amendment, and the general tenor of public advocacy all indicated that the limitation of public abortion funding on grounds of "choice" was the view most popularly held at that time.69

During the seventies, therefore, the rhetorical process of working the new ideographs, narratives, and characterizations of abortion into the public ideology went forward in piecemeal fashion. Although abortion was legal, and although the tale of illegal abortion was widely recognized, the fundamental conflict between the ideographs "life" and "choice" was not resolved and a continuing adherence to a positive characterization of the family and motherhood was not disturbed.70 In addition, Pro-life advocates maintained a steady effort to limit the times, places, finances, and conditions under which an abortion could be performed. Thus, by 1977, the sixth stage of the argument, the stalemate, had occurred.

**THE LATE SEVENTIES**

New argumentative strategies based on comparison arose from the standoff. Advocates on both sides attempted to assert a superior claim to their opponents' ideographs, narratives, and characterizations. For example, Pro-choice advocates claimed legal abortions protected "life"—the lives of adult women. Meanwhile, Pro-life advocates claimed that "choice" was exercised in the decision to have sexual intercourse, and that one did not have a right to choose to kill.71

This stalemate was actually the first step in a public reconciliation of the two ideographic clusters. The standoff led to a reaching for new audiences. Pro-life advocates attempted to convert liberals on the humanistic, ideographic grounds of "life." Pro-choice advocates attempted to convert conservatives on the practical and ideographic grounds of costs and "no government interference."72

These attempts to gain new adherents led rapidly, in the late seventies, to a seventh stage, fragmentation. As the ideologies became less and less univocal, the Pro-life argument took three major forms.73 First, Catholics and liberals argued on the basis of the ideographs "life" and "humanity."74 Second, fundamentalists and the Right argued from the ideograph "family" and from characterizations of women, home, and children.75 Finally, all parties used the argument based on "love," which asked for sacrifice for the sake of the fetus.76
The Pro-choice ideology also showed some signs of differentiation. A demand for "control" and rejection of male "oppression" remained, but it was not complete. The request for "control" was rooted in a negative characterization of the traditional family. That was generally effective as a demand for eliminating the old order, but because "choice" and "individual freedom" were the bases of the new order, there were no concrete narratives and no clear, positive characterizations supplied by the Pro-choice advocates to indicate what should replace the old order. It seemed that any image or characterization that was suggested to fill the void might imply a denial of the freedom to choose an alternative image or characterization.

In addition, fundamental disagreements and uncertainties existed among the advocates. Some wished to celebrate motherhood as a special feminine strength; others wished to deny uniqueness to motherhood. One possibility in rejecting the old order of female second-class status was to promote the female to first-class status ahead of males. To many, however, that sounded too much like the Phyllis Schlafly-style claim that women already were "put on a pedestal." Moreover, the previous emphasis on equal rights from the Civil Rights movement led to a focus on equal treatment of women and men. Even the equality solution was problematic. Whether because of natural causes or socialization, many women did not want to give up the positive values of child-bearing, motherhood, and customs of deference to males. Thus, although the Pro-choice advocates generally agreed that they wanted to replace the "traditional" family, many wanted to celebrate a new concept of "family," and others rejected family altogether.

This stage of fragmentation signalled a form of public reconciliation. In spite of continued vociferous argument from advocates on all sides, the poll data, legislative outcomes, and public characterizations of abortion indicate that the public had begun to accept key values from both sides. This does not mean that "public agreement" of any permanent and clear form had been achieved. Nonetheless, the controversy had reoriented our national understanding of abortion in a manner that more fully recognized both the undesirability and desirability of abortion for its roles in protecting women, fetal life, and social family structures. In other words, the material forces of the various sides had been balanced precarious through a long and difficult rhetorical process.

The material forces involved (working women, churches, doctors, patriarchs, etc.) could not "negotiate" with each other directly. An individual woman could only have or not have an abortion. She could only be forced or not forced into motherhood. However, on the social level, rhetoric could mediate these material forces to engender a social consensus about abortion which expressed all of the relevant forces. Such a consensus allowed the continued existence of these social forces in some form or another, and determined the nature of the experience of abortion for all Americans.

Even in a callously quantitative way, in fact, a compromise had been reached. Many abortions were conducted legally each year, but social attitudes against abortion and in favor of nurturing had been retained, so that abortion had not generally become the birth control method of choice (as it had in Eastern countries where no such public mediation of values took place every time abortion policy was altered). The rhetorical balance thus materially protected women from hundreds of thousands of dangerous illegal abortions, while discouraging many hundreds of
thousands of preventable fetus killings. It did not satisfy all participants, but it met some of the needs of all.

After twenty years of vitriolic debate an important plateau in the public argument about abortion was reached in 1980. The argument had passed through seven identifiable stages. First, a professional stage of argument conducted in non-public arenas had shaped and encouraged a public argument. Then, the early public argument began with a narrative phase, in which stories of the horrors of illegal abortion were recounted. Third, in interaction with the Civil Rights issue and as a result of weaknesses in the narrative argument, the auxiliary ideographic stage focusing on “discrimination” developed. Fourth, feminist concerns spurred the stage of intrinsic ideographic argument, as the ideograph “choice” became central. Then, in the mid-seventies came the complicated stage of normalization following legal intervention. Some parties attempted to work out the details of legal abortion, while others escalated the arguments against it. In the sixth stage came the stalemate; two mature ideological components presented themselves to the public and compared their values and practices to each other. Finally, the arguments on each side began to reach out for new audiences, and in so doing, to fracture, becoming multi-vocal. The seventh stage, fragmentation, signalled that elements of a new ideological structure had become widely accepted by the public—abortion was legal, a majority favored a “woman’s choice,” and millions of women were exercising the option of legal abortion. However, this structure was tightly hedged by other values, and “choice” was thus limited by “life” and “family.”

The American process of public argument led to a reaffirmation of the core of each of these values and interests by broadening the vocabulary and altering legal and medical conditions. Even though the rhetorical war had been vicious and even violent at times, the resulting stasis was exactly what the heralds of public argument (Milton, Locke, Mill, etc.) proclaimed open public argument would bring—a rational moderation (though not an ideal or necessarily equitable one) of the conflicting interests of arguing groups.

IMPLICATIONS

This study indicates the need for several lines of further research. For example, the relationship between the patterns described here and Aileen Krador’s distinction between arguments from “expediency” and from “justice” in the suffrage movement need to be explored. A fuller explanation of the relationship between the arguments of the women’s movement and the abortion controversy is also worthy of examination. On the theoretical level, the seven-stage pattern of argument that arose in the abortion argument may prove to underlie, at least in part, some set of social movements. An investigation of the generalizability of the pattern seems desirable.

Finally, this essay demonstrates a viable method for rhetorical analyses of social change. First, it indicates the value of diachronic, rather than synchronic investigation. Too many movement studies treat the rhetoric of an organization as one static unit, rather than as a responsive, developing set of arguments. Second, instead of focusing on the advocacy of only one side of a controversy, it analyzes the social text created by the advocates of various sides of the controversy, interacting with each
other and the public. Third, in contrast to Burkean and other studies, which prescribe a pattern to be found in discourse (e.g. order, guilt, victimage, or inception, crisis, and consummation), this study argues that if we purposefully and systematically follow specific units of discourse throughout the course of a movement, we may discover a variety of patterns and relationships. We may note ideographs, narratives, and characterizations; or fantasy themes, personae, and scenarios; or metaphors, culturetypes, and images. A systematic tracing of a specific set of features can tell us a good deal about both the content and structure of the movement. In the process of collecting several such systematic, diachronic studies of the discourse produced in our “social text,” we may add significantly to our theoretical understanding of the fascinating processes of human social change.

**Notes**

1See, for example, Robert N. Lynch, “Abortion and 1976 Politics,” America, 6 March 1976, p. 177. The exhaustion of the issue was also noted in the legislature; see, Susan Fraher et al., “Abortion Under Attack,” Reader’s Digest, September 1978, p. 42. Since there can be no “neutral position” on a moral issue such as abortion, I wish to admit my biases from the outset. I believe that abortion, especially after the first eight weeks of pregnancy, is highly undesirable because it takes the life of a potential human and submits a woman to an unpleasant (or worse) medical procedure. I do not believe, however, that the most effective means to reduce the number of abortions (especially late-term abortions) is to outlaw all abortions.

2This analysis is based on a systematic reading of all the articles indexed under the heading “abortion” in the Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature from 1960 to 1980. In addition, a non-systematic analysis was made of newspaper articles and editorials, pamphlets, books, and broadcast items. The major differences between the magazine sample and the other sources are these: the newspapers are more particularized, dealing with specific subsets of issues; the broadcast media tend to be vastly abbreviated, except in Public Broadcast debates; and pamphlets tend to be extremist.

3The method involved counting and analyzing what some theorists consider to be the two main elements of argumentative discourse—the ideographs and the pentadic elements. An ideograph is a condensed social normative term which serves as a warrant for public behavior (e.g. “liberty”). See Michael Calvin McGee, “The Ideograph: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66 (1980), 1–17. A “pentadic analysis” charts the grammar of the motive structure in a discourse. The grammar consists of the relationships among the agents, acts, agencies, scenes, and purposes which are “characterized” concretely by the rhetors. See Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (1945; rpt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).


9See, for example, Harold Rosen, ed., Therapeutic Abortion (New York: Julian Press, 1964). For a discussion of early conferences, see Sarvis and Rodman.
am making no attempt to speculate on the "causes" of this alteration in pressure. It does not matter whether the increased tension was caused by an increase in the numbers of illegal abortions, the number of legal abortions sought, or merely changes in attitudes. The rhetorical effect was "tension" among the physicians and they expressed that through discourse and behavior changes. Doctors with opinions ranging from Guttmacher's liberalism to Nathanson's eventual conservatism on the issue testified to these "tensions." See Bernad Nathanson with Richard Ouling, Aborting America (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1979), Alan Guttmacher, The Case for Legalized Abortion Now (Berkeley: Diablo Press, 1967).

See Lawrence Lader, Abortion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 24–41, for a Pro-choice view. Throughout, I use the terms "Pro-reform," "Pro-life," and "Pro-choice" as indications of what the advocates call themselves, not as labels of endorsement.

I also led some professionals to enter the public arena as well (e.g. Guttmacher and Nathanson).

Marguerite Clark, "Abortion Racket, What Should Be Done?" Newsweek, 15 August 1960, pp. 50–2, or Muriel Davidson, "Deadly Favor," Ladies Home Journal, November 1962, pp. 53–7. When citing arguments, I will generally refer to only one or two representative examples. It would be too unwieldy to list all of the articles that use a particular argument.


Davidson, pp. 53–4.

Davidson.

Martin, p. 21.

Burke, p. 3.


Other arguments were also widely used in this period. The most important of these was the largely anti-Catholic argument that no religion should be allowed to impose its morality on others. In addition, physicians made the argument that they should be able to assess their patients' treatment based on medical expertise. A wide array of specific, refutative arguments were also used; for example, there were charges and counter-charges with regard to the Finkbine thalidomide case. Throughout, I will make generalizations about the major strands of argument in each period, but when I claim that an argument was made in a certain period, I mean it was most dominant then, not that the argument was not made at any other time, or that no other arguments were made at that time.

This ideology was expressed most vocally in the Catholic magazines during the early period. Other magazines did not carry the Pro-life argument until the late sixties (even conservative magazines like the National Review). For more elaboration, see Celeste Condit Railsback, "The Contemporary American Abortion Controversy: A Study of Public Argumentation," Diss., University of Iowa, 1982. This ideology and interest was not, of course, exclusively Catholic, but they were the most vocal group. This changed later in the controversy as conservative and fundamentalist organizations became involved. In the early sixties, the argument was based on God's gift of life. In later periods it was based on other foundations for "life" and on the importance of the family.

Legal changes occurred in 1967, as Colorado, North Carolina, and California all modified their statutes more or less after the American Legal Institute's Model Code. In 1968 Georgia and Maryland also made changes. In 1969, Kansas, Delaware, Arkansas, New Mexico, and Oregon modified their laws. A list of the dates of reform and repeal bills can be found in Sarvis and Rodman, pp. 30–33.


"Candle in a Dark World," and McCormick.

From early in the sixties, advocates publicly argued for total repeal of abortion laws. Their views were generally not given much public and legislative attention until the late sixties. Other advocates argued only for reform.


31To indicate that the narratives contained contradictions is not to indict them. The contradictions are a result of the rhetorical situation, not the ineptitude or error of the speakers.


33Clark; Goodman, pp. 70–1.

34For example, Richard P. Vaughn notes that "the immature side of her nature rebels against the prospect of being a mother," but at another level she craves "the experience of fulfillment and creativity that accompanies

The actual number of illegal abortions is uncertain. Most estimates range from 200,000 to two million. In any case, the number had to be substantial (especially given 350,000 hospital admissions for complications from abortion). For "real causes," see Walter Goodman, and also, "Abortion Sought Abroad," *Science News Letter*, 24 July 1965, p. 63; *Health*, April, 1965, pp. 24–25.

I refer here to the date the "women's movement" was brought into the public consciousness, not the academic or aesthetic circles. Gallup polls and popular magazine coverage indicate that this did not occur until the late sixties. This is, of course, a reflexive relationship; the material conditions surrounding the act of abortion help to generate the ideographs, but then are affected by interpretations produced by the ideology once it is developed.

*Martin*, p. 52.


Goodman, p. 71; Lader, *Abortion*, pp. 56–7; Davidson, p. 54.

I am not arguing that changes in economics or social structure had taken place, merely that the terms were prevalent in popular discourse at the time. Even the somewhat negative polls showing that "racial harmony" was a major concern in the presidential elections of the period establish this point. See "Most Important Problems During Election Campaigns," *Gallup Opinion Index*, No. 181, September 1980, p. 11.

A shift in attitudes can be traced, for example, in the desirability of black neighbors to whites. From 1958 to 1963 the primary position changed towards equality occurred in the South. From 1963–1965 there were also important attitude changes of about ten percent in the North. George H. Gallup, *Public Opinion: 1935–1971* (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 1572–73, 1824, 1941.


or Robert E. Hall in *Saturday Review*, 7 December 1968, pp. 78–9.

Discrimination, the argument went, was caused by the rich having the resources to circumvent a law that was not supported by public experience, whereas the poor did not have such resources. Reform laws did not ameliorate that discrepancy.

See n. 34. The concept "choice" arose as much from this demand to have motherhood be an option, as from any other source.


*Mohr*, p. 167.

"Coping with Abortion."

Alaska and Hawaii adopted very liberal laws, and New York adopted a virtual repeal law. However, in 1971 and 1972 there was a strong counter-reaction as referenda in North Dakota and Michigan were vigorously rejected and New York's repeal law was almost overturned, while Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and even the federal courts rejected abortion repeal. Actural changes in attitudes are difficult to document. Judith Blake, in "The Abortion Decisions: Judicial Review and Public Opinion," in Edward Manier, William Liu and David Solomon, eds., *Abortion: New Directions for Policy Studies* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 51–81, concluded that there was relatively little change from 1964 to 1971. At that time, the laws were merely "catching up" with public attitudes. However, there was a fair amount of change reported after this period by Eric M. Ullsner and Ronald E. Weber in "Public Support for Pro-Choice Abortion Policies in the Nation and States: Changes and Stability After the Roe and Doe Decisions," in Carl E. Schneider and Maris A. Vinovskis, eds., *The Law and Politics of Abortion* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1980), pp. 206–23.

Over 200,000 abortions were performed in New York in a single year; see Lader, *Abortion II*, pp. 166–67.


Kirk, p. 1407; "Twisted Logic: Propositions to Legalize Abortion," *Christianity Today*, 22 December 1972, pp. 24–5. In addition to the testimony of these Pro-life sources, it is telling evidence to the effectiveness of the picture
campaigns that Lader is silent about the defeat of the referenda on abortion in Michigan. He indicates a good bit of organization and effort by Pro-choice forces in Michigan, and does not attempt to account for the loss. Lader, *Abortion II*, pp. 182–84.


41Ramifications of the still-developing ideograph “choice” have not yet been fully appreciated. Applications to euthanasia, the draft, suicide, work, and even travel become increasingly important as the persuasive power of the term grows. Examples of the “choice” rhetoric can be seen in John D. Rockefeller III, “No Retreat on Abortion,” *Newsweek*, 21 June 1976, p. 11 and Francis Baudry and Alfred Wiener, “Women’s Choice: Pregnancy or Abortion,” *Mademoiselle*, April 1974, p. 34.

42Gallup poll data show that a majority of the people adopted the ideographs of the “women’s movement” while maintaining the concrete characterizations of the dominant ideology. For a more detailed analysis, see Railsback, pp. 113–18.

43Ros v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (October 1972), 70–1B, pp. 154, 163.

44Ros v. Wade, pp. 153, 163.

45To describe public opinion adequately would require more space than is available. I have argued, however, that Judith Blake’s interpretation is oversimplified. The public accepted the ideographs of both sets of advocates, but viewed their application as a weighting based on two factors: stage of fetal development and goodness of purpose as defined by the dominant ideology. See Railsback, pp. 167–75.


49Dr. Kenneth Edelin was tried and convicted for killing a fetus when he conducted a second term abortion, but his conviction was eventually overturned. Dr. William Waddill was brought to trial three times in a similar case that bridged the abortion-murder linguist ambiguity. Marla Pitchford was tried for attempting to abort herself when she was unable to obtain a long-term medical abortion from legal sources. David M. Alpern, “Abortion and the Law,” *Newsweek*, 3 March 1975, pp. 18–29; Carol Altekruse Berger and Patrick F. Berger, “The Edelin Decision,” *Commonweal*, 25 August 1975, p. 77; “Abortion: The Edelin Schock Wave,” *Time*, 3 March 1975, p. 54; Eileen Keerdoo and Ying Yiling Wu, “Dr. Waddill: Triple Jeopardy?” *Newsweek*, 7 January 1980, p. 10; “The Scarlet A,” *Time*, 11 September 1978, p. 22.


51The Hyde Amendment withdrew federal funding of abortion through sources such as Medicaid. Other amendments eliminated funding for military and other government personnel. In the legislature, the most frequent argument for elimination of government funding remained the claim that abortion was the murder of the unborn. However, this was not the most effective argument because it appealed primarily to the solid anti-abortion constituency. The argument that federal funding of abortions was a “choice” and that it took away the choice of some taxpayers was more crucial because it appealed to the “swing vote.” Although no polls of legislators are available to indicate the reasons for their choices (and such polls would probably be inaccurate), the fact that the argument for “taxpayers choice” gradually gained in frequency of presentation throughout the several years of hearings indicates that it came to be viewed as one of the most persuasive arguments. See Rep. (Mrs.) Lloyd, *Congressional Record*, 124, pt 13, 13 June 1978, (Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 17261. See also Mr. Quie of Minn. same publication, vol 122, pt 2, 10 August 1976, p. 26788, or Mr. Gruyer, 24 June, 1976, p. 20411.

52The acceptance of these disparate factors is evident in poll data which show that majorities favored positions which gave women the choice in abortion, but, when asked about which abortions should be legal, they were most lemm with the “hard case” aborions and scaled their leniency to the stage of pregnancy and whether or not birth control had been used. Poll data also support continued reliance on traditional sex role stereotypes. See Railsback, pp. 114–18, 167–72.


See the ambivalence indicated in Alice Lake, "Abortion Repeaters," McCall's, September 1980, p. 58.


These are the same arguments described in feminist philosophy; see Alison Jaggar, "Political Philosophies of Women's Liberation," in Feminism and Philosophy, ed. Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick A. Elliston, and Jane English (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, and Company, 1981).

This does not rule out further legal change. However, major shifts in attitudes and experience seem unlikely, and even further legal change will probably provide exceptions for some legal abortions.

This is not to suggest that serious legal and material conflicts or "irrationalities" do not remain. For example, the current number of late-term abortions, current funding conditions, and squabbles over "informed consent" laws show important residual problem areas that desperately need further negotiation.


As described in notes 60 and 63, the polls provide proof of such an interpretation. In addition, admission by Pro-choice advocates of the negative aspects of abortion, and continued rejection of those who used abortion as their primary birth control method, further suggested the hedging around the legalization of abortion. See Railsback, pp. 278-79.


Jaggar.


