CONSTITUTIVE RHETORIC:
THE CASE OF THE PEUPLE QUÉBÉCOIS

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In The Rhetoric of Motives, Kenneth Burke proposes "identification" as an alternative to "persuasion" as the key term of the rhetorical process. Burke's project is a rewriting of rhetorical theory that considers rhetoric and motives in formal terms, as consequences of the nature of language and its enactment. Burke's stress on identification permits a rethinking of judgment and the working of the rhetorical effect, for he does not posit a transcendent subject as audience member, who would exist prior to and apart from the speech to be judged, but considers audience members to participate in the very discourse by which they would be "persuaded." Audiences would embody a discourse. A consequence of this theoretical move is that it permits an understanding within rhetorical theory of ideological discourse, of the discourse that presents itself as always only pointing to the given, the natural, the already agreed upon. In particular, it permits us to examine how rhetorical effects what Louis Althusser identifies as the key process in the production of ideology: the constitution of the subject, where the subject is precisely he or she who simultaneously speaks and initiates action in discourse (a subject to a verb) and in the world (a speaker and social agent).

As Burke recognizes, "persuasion," as rhetoric's key term, implies the existence of an agent who is free to be persuaded. However, rhetorical theory's privileging of an audience's freedom to judge is problematic, for it assumes that audiences, with their prejudices, interests, and motives, are given and so extra-rhetorical. Rhetorical criticism, as Grossberg points out, posits the existence of transcendental subjects whom discourse would mediate. In other words, rhetorical theory usually refuses to consider the possibility that the very existence of social subjects (who would become audience members) is already a rhetorical effect. Nevertheless, much of what we as rhetorical critics consider to be a product or consequence of discourse, including social identity, religious faith, sexuality, and ideology is beyond the realm of rational or even free choice, beyond the realm of persuasion. As Burke notes, the identifications of social identity can occur "spontaneously, intuitively, even unconsciously." Such identifications are rhetorical, for they are discursive effects that induce human cooperation. They are also, however, logically prior to persuasion. Indeed, humans are constituted in these characteristics; they are essential to the "nature" of a subject.
and form the basis for persuasive appeals. Consequently, attempts to elucidate ideological or identity-forming discourses as persuasive are trapped in a contradiction: persuasive discourse requires a subject-as-audience who is already constituted with an identity and within an ideology.

Ultimately then, theories of rhetoric as persuasion cannot account for the audiences that rhetoric addresses. However, such an account is critical to the development of a theoretical understanding of the power of discourse. If it is easier to praise Athens before Athenians than before Laecedemonians, we should ask how those in Athens come to experience themselves as Athenians. Indeed, a rhetoric to Athenians in praise of Athens would be relatively insignificant compared to a rhetoric that constitutes Athenians as such. What I propose to develop in this essay is a theory of constitutive rhetoric that would account for this process. I will elaborate this theory of constitutive rhetoric through an examination of a case where the identity of the audience is clearly problematic: the independence movement in Quebec, Canada’s French-speaking province. There, supporters of Quebec’s political sovereignty addressed and so attempted to call into being a peuple québécois that would legitimize the constitution of a sovereign Quebec state.

Central to my analysis of the constitutive rhetoric of Quebec sovereignty will be Althusser’s category of the subject. Examining what Michael McGee would term Quebec’s rhetoric of a “people,” I will show how claims for Quebec sovereignty base themselves upon the asserted existence of a particular type of subject, the “Québécois.” That subject and the collectivized “peuple québécois” are, in Althusser’s language, “interpellated” as political subjects through a process of identification in rhetorical narratives that “always already” presume the constitution of subjects. From this perspective, a subject is not “persuaded” to support sovereignty. Support for sovereignty is inherent to the subject position addressed by souverainiste (pro-sovereignty) rhetoric because of what we will see to be a series of narrative ideological effects.

THE QUEST FOR QUEBEC SOVEREIGNTY

In 1967, the year of Canada’s centennial, a new political association was formed in Quebec. This organization, the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association (MSA), dedicated itself to Quebec’s political sovereignty as it proclaimed the existence of an essence uniting social actors in the province. In French, Quebec’s majority language, the MSA declared: “Nous sommes des Québécois” (“We are Québécois”) and called for Quebec’s independence from Canada. This declaration marked the entry of the term “Québécois” into the mainstream of Quebec political discourse. Until that time, members of the French-speaking society of Quebec were usually termed “Canadiens français” (“French-Canadians”). With the MSA, a national identity for a new type of political subject was born, a subject whose existence would be presented as justification for the constitution of a new state. Thus, the MSA’s declaration is an instance of constitutive rhetoric, for it calls its audience into being. Furthermore, as an instance of constitutive rhetoric, it was particularly effective, for within a decade of the creation of that mouvement, the term “Québécois” had gained currency even among certain supporters of the Canadian federal system, and Quebec voters had brought the MSA’s successor, the Parti Québécois (PQ), to power.

Quebec voters gave the Parti Québécois control of the Quebec government on November 15, 1976. The party obtained 41.4% of the popular vote and won 71 of
110 seats in the Assemblé nationale, Quebec's legislature. This election marked a major transformation in Canada's political life, for the PQ asserted that those in Quebec constituted a distinct peuple with the right and duty to political sovereignty, and was committed to leading Quebec, Canada's largest and second most populous province, out of Canada.

The PQ's major campaign promise was to hold a referendum on Quebec's political sovereignty during its first term of office. In preparation of this plebiscite, the Quebec government issued, on November 1, 1979, a formal policy statement, a "white paper," that outlined a proposed new political order in which Quebec would be a sovereign state associated economically with Canada. While the Quebec-Canada economic association would include free trade, a customs union, a shared currency and central bank as negotiated, and the free movement of persons across the Quebec-Canada border, each government would have the full sovereignty of a nation-state. The White Paper asserted that those in Quebec constituted a peuple and called upon them to support this project by voting OUI in a forthcoming referendum. Such a positive vote by the Quebec electorate would mandate their provincial government to negotiate for the envisioned new constitutional status with the federal government in Ottawa.

The White Paper, as it articulated the reasons for Quebec's political independence, was a rhetorical document. It offered a variety of arguments demonstrating that Québécois were an oppressed peuple within the confines of Canada's constitution who would be better off with their own country. These arguments were presented in the context of the constitutive rhetoric of the "peuple québécois." This constitutive rhetoric took the form of a narrative account of Quebec history in which Québécois were identified with their forebears who explored New France, who suffered under the British conquest, and who struggled to erect the Quebec provincial state apparatus.

The Referendum on sovereignty-association was held May 20, 1980. Although a majority of the populace voted against the measure, over 45% of the French-speaking population assented to their provincial government's interpretation of Quebec society. Those voting OUI granted the legitimacy of the constitutional claims the White Paper asserted. Clearly, even if a majority of Québécois were not ready to seek sovereignty, a malaise powerful enough to dominate political debate and government priorities existed in the province. There was a strong sense in which "Québécois" was a term antithetical to "Canadien."

The election of the Parti Québécois and the strength of its souverainiste option in the Referendum reveals the significance of the constitutive rhetoric of a "peuple québécois." While some might consider the White Paper to be a rhetorical failure because less than half of Quebec's French-speaking population opted for independence, the outcome of the Referendum reveals that its constitutive rhetoric was particularly powerful. This rhetoric, which presents those in Quebec as Québécois requiring and deserving their own state, constituted at least close to half of Quebec voters such that they, as an audience, were not really Canadians.

What the debate in Quebec reveals is that the very character of a collective identity, and the nature of its boundary, of who is a member of the collectivity, were problematic. In other words, in Quebec there existed a struggle over the constitution of political subjects. In Quebec, the possibility of an alternative peuple and history was entertained. Thus, the movement for sovereignty permits us to see how peoples are rhetorically constituted.
“Peuple” as Legitimating Principle

As Michael McGee has noted, the term “people” can rhetorically legitimate constitutions.12 Not surprisingly then, the independence debate in Quebec, as it developed since the formation of the MSA, centered upon whether a peuple québécois exists, and more importantly, on whether that peuple is the kind of “people” that legitimates a sovereign state. In Quebec, competing claims were made as to the nature of the peuple. Consider, for example, Claude Morin’s polemical history of Quebec-Ottawa constitutional disputes from 1960 to 1972, where he distinguishes the emergent Quebec collectivity from its predecessor, French-Canada, as he identifies the perspective of the Quebec government: “Like many other peoples, Quebeckers have experienced an awakening of self-consciousness. They want to assert themselves, not as French-speaking Canadians, but as Québécois, citizens who, for the moment, suffer the want of a country that is their own.”13 In Morin’s view, not only are those in Quebec Québécois, but they constitute the kind of peuple that warrants a sovereign state. Morin’s observation confirms that populations can at different historical moments gain different identities that warrant different forms of collective life. Furthermore, if we consider that Morin’s observation is contentious and partisan,14 and that many in Quebec would contest his assessment of their collective identity, we find confirmation of McGee’s further assertion that the identity of a “people,” as a rhetorical construct, is not even agreed upon by those who would address it.15 Rather, supporters and opponents of Quebec sovereignty both seek to justify their position on the basis of what they assert is a will intrinsic to their version of the peuple’s very being. Their rhetoric is grounded in the constitution of Québécois as political subjects.

The debate over sovereignty in Quebec clearly reveals the degree to which peoples are constituted in discourse. Those in Quebec could be “Québécois”; they could also be “Canadiens français.” The distinction is crucial, for only the former type of “peuple” can claim the right to a sovereign state. Indeed, the debate in Quebec permits us to see the radical implication of McGee’s argument, for not only is the character or identity of the “peuple” open to rhetorical revision, but the very boundary of whom the term “peuple” includes and excludes is rhetorically constructed: as the “peuple” is variously characterized, the persons who make up the “peuple” can change. Thus, consider the rather extreme counter-argument to Morin’s claim that a peuple québécois exists and is gaining self-awareness, as articulated by William Shaw and Lionel Albert, two Quebec opponents of sovereignty, who conversely assert that no Quebec peuple exists, that the term “Québécois” properly only applies to residents of the City of Quebec, and that the term as used by Quebec nationalists constitutes a “semantic fraud”:

Separatists measure the degree of their penetration of the public consciousness by the extent to which the people are willing to call themselves Québécois. The more they can persuade the French Canadians in Quebec to call themselves Québécois, the easier the task of insinuating the idea that those French Canadians who happen to live in eastern or northern Ontario or in northern New Brunswick are somehow “different” from those living in Quebec. Once that idea has been established, then the idea that Quebec’s borders, which are criss-crossed daily by tens of thousands of French Canadians, could somehow be thought of, not as casual signposts along the highway, but as a full-fledged international boundary, can also be established.16
Shaw and Albert display a keen sensitivity to the workings of the *pêquiste* rhetoric of collective identity, even if as advocates, these opponents of Quebec independence assert that a French-Canadian *peuple* "really" exists outside of rhetorical construction. What Shaw and Albert ignore, of course, is that the French-speaking *peuple* or nation that they assert exists also becomes real only through rhetoric. Indeed, the possibility of political action requires that political actors be within a "fictional" discourse. More precisely, as Althusser asserts: "there is no practice except by and in an ideology."17 Political identity must be an ideological fiction, even though, as McGee correctly notes, this fiction becomes historically material and of consequence as persons live it.

**THE RHETORIC OF INTERPELLATION**

As we have seen, rhetorical claims for a sovereign Quebec are predicated upon the existence of an ideological subject, the "Québécois," so constituted that sovereignty is a natural and necessary way of life. Furthermore, and hardly surprisingly, the ultimate justification for these claims is the subject's character, nature, or essence. This is so because this identity defines inherent motives and interests that a rhetoric can appeal to. The ideological "trick" of such a rhetoric is that it presents that which is most rhetorical, the existence of a *peuple*, or of a subject, as extrarhetorical. These members of the *peuple* whose supposed essence demands action do not exist in nature, but only within a discursively constituted history. Thus, this rhetoric paradoxically must constitute the identity "Québécois" as it simultaneously presumes it to be pregiven and natural, existing outside of rhetoric and forming the basis for a rhetorical address.

We find a treatment of this constitutive phenomenon in Edwin Black's discussion of the "second persona."18 As Michael McGuire observes, Black's process of transforming an audience occurs through *identification*, in Burke's sense.19 However, to simply accept such an account of this process would be inadequate. It would not fully explain the significance of becoming one with a persona, of entering into and embodying it. In particular, to simply state that audiences identify with a persona explains neither (1) the ontological status of those in the audience before their identification, nor (2) the ontological status of the persona, and the nature of identifying with it. In order to clarify these ontological issues, we must consider carefully the radical edge of Burke's identificatory principle. Burke asserts that, as "symbol using" animals, our being is significantly constituted in our symbolicity. As Burke puts it, "so much of the 'we' that is separated from the nonverbal by the verbal would not even exist were it not for the verbal (or for our symbolicity in general[)]."20

In this, Burke moves towards collapsing the distinction between the realm of the symbolic and that of human conceptual consciousness. From such a perspective, we cannot accept the 'givenness' of "audience," "person," or "subject," but must consider their very textuality, their very constitution in rhetoric as a structured articulation of signs. We must, in other words, consider the textual nature of social being.

The symbolically based critique of humanist ontology implicit in Burke has been developed in a tradition sharing much with him, that of structuralism.21 Structuralist semiotics and narrative theory have deconstructed the concept of the unitary and transcendent subject. And, with rhetorical theory, they share an appreciation of the
power of discourse, of its effects. Thus, in order to develop the radical implications of Burke’s lead, it is to this tradition that I will turn.

Altthusser describes the process of inscribing subjects into ideology as “interpellation”:22

I shall then suggest that ideology “acts” or “functions” in such a way that it “recruits” subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or “transforms” the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: “Hey, you there!”23

Interpellation occurs at the very moment one enters into a rhetorical situation, that is, as soon as an individual recognizes and acknowledges being addressed. An interpellated subject participates in the discourse that addresses him. Thus, to be interpellated is to become one of Black’s personae and be a position in a discourse. In consequence, interpellation has a significance to rhetoric, for the acknowledgment of an address entails an acceptance of an imputed self-understanding which can form the basis for an appeal. Furthermore, interpellation occurs rhetorically, through the effect of the addressed discourse. Note, however, that interpellation does not occur through persuasion in the usual sense, for the very act of addressing is rhetorical. It is logically prior to the rhetorical narratio. In addition, this rhetoric of identification is ongoing, not restricted to one hailing, but usually part of a rhetoric of socialization. Thus, one must already be an interpellated subject and exist as a discursive position in order to be part of the audience of a rhetorical situation in which persuasion could occur.

THE “PEUPLE” AS NARRATIVE IDEOLOGICAL EFFECT

Events in Quebec demonstrate that the “peuple” is a persona, existing in rhetoric, and not in some neutral history devoid of human interpretation. But note, personae are not persons; they remain in the realm of words. As McGee observes, a “people” is a fiction which comes to be when individuals accept living within a political myth.24 This myth would be ontological, constitutive of those “seduced” by it. In Quebec, what McGee terms the myth of the “people” is articulated in the Quebec government’s White Paper. This document, speaking in the name of the independence movement, as institutionalized in a party and a government, offers a narrative of Quebec history that renders demands for sovereignty intelligible and reasonable.

The White Paper’s narrative of the peuple since the founding of New France, through the British Conquest, the development of Canada into a federated state, and the setting up of the Referendum on Quebec sovereignty is, in McGee’s sense, a myth. It paradoxically both reveals the peuple and makes it real. This making real is part of the ontological function of narratives. Indeed, as Jameson points out, “history . . . is inaccessible to us except in textual form, and . . . our approach to it and the Real itself necessarily passes through its prior textualization, its narrativization in the political unconscious.”25 Because the peuple exists as a subject in history, it is only intelligible within a narrative representation of history. In other words, this peuplie, and the individual subject, the Québécois, exist as positions in a text.

Narratives “make real” coherent subjects. They constitute subjects as they present
a particular textual position, such as the noun-term “people québécois” as the locus for action and experience. Roland Barthes well expresses this ultimate textuality of narratives when he asserts that: “Narrative does not show, does not imitate; the passion which may excite us . . . is not that of a ‘vision’ (in actual fact, we do not ‘see’ anything).” In other words, narratives work through a representational effect. Texts are but surfaces; characters are, in a sense, but “paper beings,” to use Barthes’ phrase. These paper beings seem real through textual operations. The distinct acts and events in a narrative become linked through identification arising from the narrative form. Narratives lead us to construct and fill in coherent unified subjects out of temporally and spatially separate events. This renders the site of action and experience stable. The locus of yesterday’s acts becomes that of today’s. Consequently, narratives offer a world in which human agency is possible and acts can be meaningful.

All narratives, as they create the illusion of merely revealing a unified and unproblematic subjectivity, are ideological, because they occult the importance of discourse, culture, and history in giving rise to subjectivity, and because, as G. H. Mead and Freud have made clear, subjectivity is always social, constituted in language, and exists in a delicate balance of contradictory drives and impulses. Narratives suppress the fact that, in a very real sense, no person is the same as he or she was a decade ago, or last year, or indeed yesterday. In raising the ultimate “falsity” of narratives, my intention is not, however, to decry them and hold out for some unmediated consciousness. Nor am I here concerned with a philosophical critique of the subject in Western civilization. My intention is to show the degree to which collective identities forming the basis of rhetorical appeals themselves depend upon rhetoric; the “people québécois,” and “peoples” in general, exist only through an ideological discourse that constitutes them. Furthermore, if the subject in all narratives is ideological, a “people” is triply so, for it does not even have a unitary body corresponding to its imputed unitary agency and consciousness. The persona or subject “people québécois” exists only as a series of narrative ideological effects.

In the rhetoric of Quebec sovereignty, the “Québécois” is a collective subject. It offers, in Burke’s language, an “ultimate” identification permitting an overcoming or going beyond of divisive individual or class interests and concerns. This identity transcends the limitations of the individual body and will. This process of constituting a collective subject is the first ideological effect of constitutive rhetoric. If a peuple exists, it is only in ideology, as McGee makes clear. That ideology arises in the very nature of narrative history. To tell the story of the Québécois is implicitly to assert the existence of a collective subject, the protagonist of the historical drama, who experiences, suffers, and acts. Such a narrative renders the world of events understandable with respect to a transcendent collective interest that negates individual interest. Consider the following passage from the White Paper’s account of early French North America:

Our ancestors put down their roots in American soil at the beginning of the 17th century, at the time the first English settlers were landing on the East coast of the United States. As they were clearing the land of the St. Lawrence valley, they explored the vast continent in all directions, from the Atlantic to the Rocky Mountains, and from Hudson Bay to the Gulf of Mexico. Through discovering, claiming, and occupying the land, Québécois came to consider themselves North-Americans.

In 1760, our community was already an established society along the St. Lawrence.
In a radically empiricist mood, I could assert that a society *qua* society has no soul, no struggles, no successes. Clearly, history proceeds by the acts of individuals. But, of course, individuals can act in concert or as a mass, they can respond to apersonal historical forces, and we can interpret the sum total of their individual actions with respect to a collective agent. Historical narratives offer such interpretations. In the telling of the story of a *peuple*, a *peuple* comes to be. It is within the formal structure of a narrative history that it is possible to conceive of a set of individuals as if they were but one. Thus, the "struggles" and "ordeals" of settlers, as a set of individual acts and experiences, become identified with "community," a term that here masks or negates tensions and differences between members of any society. The community of Québécois is the master agent of a narratized history.

In the above passage, note also how the past is presented as an extension of the present through the use of the pronoun "our" and the term "Québécois" as signifiers of both eighteenth century settlers who termed themselves "Canadiens" and those living in Quebec today. The White Paper, and histories of peoples in general, offer a "consubstantiality," to use Burke's expression, between the dead and the living. This positing of a transhistorical subject is the *second ideological effect* of constitutive rhetoric. Here, ancestry is offered as the concrete link between the French settlers of North America, those in Quebec today, and a collectivity. Time is collapsed as narrative identification occurs: today's Quebec residents constitute a *peuple* and have a right to their own state because members of their community have discovered, claimed, and occupied the land. This interpretive stance is perfectly reasonable. It is also perfectly tautological, for it is a making sense that depends upon the a priori acceptance of that which it attempts to prove the existence of, a collective agent, the *peuple québécois*, that transcends the limitations of individuality at any historical moment and transcends the death of individuals across history.

Form renders the "Québécois" a real subject within the historical narrative. The "Québécois" does not, however, become a free subject. Subjects within narratives are not free, they are *positioned* and so constrained. All narratives have power over the subjects they present. The endings of narratives are fixed before the telling. The freedom of the character in a narrative is an illusion, for narratives move inexorably toward their *telos*. The characters in a story are obviously not free. Only in Woody Allen's *The Purple Rose of Cairo* can characters abandon their script and walk off the screen. What Allen's film and Barthes' analysis of narratives so clearly illustrate is that narratives are but texts that offer the illusion of agency. The subject is constituted at the nodes of a narrative's surface. What Walter Fisher terms "narrative probability" is a formal and ideological constraint upon the subject's possibilities of being.²⁹ To be constituted as a subject in a narrative is to be constituted with a history, motives, and a *telos*. Thus, in the rhetoric of Quebec sovereignty, "Québécois" is not merely a descriptive term, but identifies and positions the Quebec voter with respect to his or her future.

The White Paper presents Québécois as agents, capable of acting freely in the world. However, the narrative's existence as a text is predicated upon Québécois
asserting their existence as a collective subject through a politics of independence. In the White Paper on sovereignty, Québécois are constituted in the choice of national solidarity. As Burke observes is the case in ideological narratives, the White Paper effects an identification of the temporal sequence of its plot with the logical development of an ultimate principle. In the resultant hierarchy, Québécois are free to choose only one course of action:

The Will to Survive
Sooner or later, this society would have shaken off the colonial yoke and acquired its independence, as was the case, in 1776, for the United States of America. But in 1763 the hazards of war placed it under British control. . . . Faced with this defeat, francophones spontaneously chose to be faithful. There could be no question of passing over to the winner's camp to reap the benefits that awaited them. They would adapt to the new situation, come to terms with the new masters, but above all preserve the essential of that which characterized our peuple: its language, its customs, its religion. At all costs, they would survive.

The freedom of the protagonist of this narrative is but an illusion. This illusion of freedom is the third ideological effect of constitutive rhetoric. Freedom is illusory because the narrative is already spoken or written. Furthermore, because the narrative is a structure of understanding that produces totalizing interpretations, the subject is constrained to follow through, to act so as to maintain the narrative's consistency. A narrative, once written, offers a logic of meaningful totality. Québécois, precisely because they are the subjects within a text, within a narrative rhetoric, must follow the logic of the narrative. They must be true to the motives through which the narrative constitutes them, and thus which presents characters as freely acting towards a predetermined and fixed ending.

THE EFFECTIVE POWER OF CONSTITUTIVE RHETORIC

The ideological effects of constitutive rhetoric that I have outlined are not merely formal effects inscribed within the bracketed experience of interpreting a text. In other words, these do not only permit a disinterested understanding of a fictive world. What is significant in constitutive rhetoric is that it positions the reader towards political, social, and economic action in the material world and it is in this positioning that its ideological character becomes significant. For the purpose of analysis, this positioning of subjects as historical actors can be understood as a two-step process. First, audience members must be successfully interpellated; not all constitutive rhetorics succeed. Second, the tautological logic of constitutive rhetoric must necessitate action in the material world; constitutive rhetoric must require that its embodied subjects act freely in the social world to affirm their subject position.

Audiences are, to use Althusser’s famous phrase, “always already” subjects. This is to say that if we disregard the point at which a child enters language, but restrict ourselves to “competent” speakers within a culture, we can observe that one cannot exist but as a subject within a narrative. The necessity is ontological: one must already be a subject in order to be addressed or to speak. We therefore cannot say that one is persuaded to be a subject; one is “always already” a subject. This does not imply, however, that one’s subject position is fixed at the moment one enters language. Indeed, the development of new subject positions, of new constitutive rhetorics, is possible at particular historical moments. The subject is a position
within a text. To be an embodied subject is to experience and act in a textualized world. However, this world is not seamless and a subject position’s world view can be laced with contradictions. We can, as Burke puts it, encounter “recalcitrance.” In addition, as Stuart Hall observes, various contradictory subject positions can simultaneously exist within a culture; we can live within many texts. These contradictions place a strain upon identification with a given subject position and render possible a subject’s rearticulation. Successful new constitutive rhetorics offer new subject positions that resolve, or at least contain, experienced contradictions. They serve to overcome or define away the recalcitrance the world presents by providing the subject with new perspectives and motives.

Thus, for example, the subject position “Québécois” arises from a rearticulation of two positions, that of “Canadien français,” and that of the Quebec resident and voter with a collective will ostensibly represented by the Quebec government. Because some French-Canadians live outside of Quebec and not all those in Quebec are French-speaking, the identity “Canadien français” cannot permit the articulation of a French-speaking nation-state in North America. As the White Paper never fails to remind its audience, to be “Canadien français” is to be a member of an impotent minority without a proper homeland. The White Paper, penned by the Quebec government, invokes the contradiction of being a member of a French-speaking collectivity, or nation, that does not have a sovereign state apparatus, for the Quebec government remains subject to Canada’s Federal government in Ottawa, and French-Canadians are subjects of the Federal state, a state that can be represented as ultimately foreign.

French-Canadians in Quebec had to live the contradiction of not being exclusively subjects of the state they collectively controlled. “Québécois” resolves this contradiction at the discursive level, by identifying the populace with a territory and a francophone state, rather than with an ethnic group. Constitutive rhetorics of new subject positions can be understood, therefore, as working upon previous discourses, upon previous constitutive rhetorics. They capture alienated subjects by rearticulating existing subject positions so as to contain or resolve experienced dialectical contradictions between the world and its discourses. The process by which an audience member enters into a new subject position is therefore not one of persuasion. It is akin more to one of conversion that ultimately results in an act of recognition of the ‘rightness’ of a discourse and of one’s identity with its reconfigured subject position.

The White Paper’s constitutive rhetoric, as it articulates the meaning of being “Québécois,” is not a mere fiction. It inscribes real social actors within its textualized structure of motives, and then inserts them into the world of practice. The White Paper offers a collectivized subject position that constitutes those in Quebec as members of a peuple which is transcendent of the limits of their biological individuality. This position thus opens the possibility for them to participate in a collective political project. The White Paper’s narrative is characterized by a set of formal ideological effects that permit it to be intelligible as one accepts and enters into the collective consciousness it articulates. The White Paper offers, therefore, a particular instance of narrative rhetoric that, in Fisher’s language, “give[s] order to human experience and . . . induce[s] others to dwell in [it] to establish ways of living in common, in communion in which there is sanction for the story that constitutes one’s life” (italics added). This dwelling place is, of course, prerequisite to the
power of the rhetoric of Quebec sovereignty. To be Québécois as configured by the White Paper is to embody in the world the narrative and the motives it ascribes to members of the peuple.

To enter into the White Paper's rhetorical narrative is to identify with Black's second persona. It is the process of recognizing oneself as the subject in a text. It is to exist at the nodal point of a series of identifications and to be captured in its structure and in its production of meaning. It is to be a subject which exists beyond one's body and life span. It is to have and experience the dangerous memories of British conquest and rule. It is to live towards national independence. Then, the power of the text is the power of an embodied ideology. The form of an ideological rhetoric is effective because it is within the bodies of those it constitutes as subjects. These subjects owe their existence to the discourse that articulates them. As Burke puts it: "An 'ideology' is like a god coming down to earth, where it will inhabit a place pervaded by its presence. An 'ideology' is like a spirit taking up its abode in a body: it makes that body hop around in certain ways; and that same body would have hopped around in different ways had a different ideology happened to inhabit it." 36 Thus, from the subjectivity or point of view of the embodied souverainiste discourse, not only would there exist "good reasons" for supporting sovereignty, but good motives as well, motives arising from the very essence of the Québécois' being. Within the White Paper's account is embedded a "logic," a way of understanding the world, that offers those in Quebec a position from which to understand and act.

IDENTIFICATION WITH A CONSTITUTIVE RHETORIC

If the White Paper and historical narratives were but dead history, mere stories, their significance to ideology could easily be dismissed. However, constitutive rhetorics, as they identify, have power because they are oriented towards action. As Althusser and McGee both stress, ideology is material, existing not in the realm of ideas, but in that of material practices. Ideology is material because subjects enact their ideology and reconstitute their material world in its image. 37 Constitutive rhetorics are ideological not merely because they provide individuals with narratives to inhabit as subjects and motives to experience, but because they insert "narratized" subjects-as-agents into the world.

The insertion of subjects into the world is a product of both the identificatory and referential functions of the White Paper's historical narrative and its ideological effects. In particular, it is the third ideological effect, the constitution in action of a motivated subject, that orients those addressed towards particular future acts. Since narratives offer totalizing interpretations that ascribe transcendent meanings to individual acts, the maintenance of narrative consistency demands that a certain set of acts be chosen. This is amplified in the White Paper because it offers a narrative without closure. The White Paper offers an unfinished history: the peuple québécois has yet to obtain its independence. Thus, the Québécois addressed by the White Paper must bring to a close the saga begun by the subjects of the White Paper's history. In other words, while classical narratives have an ending, constitutive rhetorics leave the task of narrative closure to their constituted subjects. It is up to the Québécois of 1980 to conclude the story to which they are identified. The story the White Paper offers is of a besieged peuple that has always continued to struggle in order to survive and to assert its right to self-determination. Nevertheless, in this
account, each advance is blocked by the colonial power. The story proceeds through the recounting of a series of episodes, each exhibiting the same pattern.

As we have already seen, the White Paper asserts that the new peuple’s aspirations were blocked by British conquest. This act of conquest recurs in other guises at other moments in the peuple’s saga. Thus, in the rhetoric of Quebec sovereignty, for example, the victims of the conquest of 1760 become the protagonists in the parliamentary wrangles of 1837. Individual subjects, the Québécois, and their collective subject, the peuple, are somehow the same, even though the actual personages, institutions, material conditions, and struggles have changed. Québécois as explorers become political subjects. Thus, the White Paper asserts:

The Parliament of Lower Canada, where the language was French, proposed laws and a budget that were submitted for approval to the Governor, who exercised executive power on behalf of London. The peuple’s will was often blocked by the veto of the Governor, particularly sensitive to the interests of the English minority of Lower Canada and those of the imperial power. The consequent tension was leading, by 1830, to exasperation. The representatives drew up a set of resolutions in which they expressed their demands: control by the Assembly of taxes and spending, and the adoption of urgent social and economic measures. The Governor refused and dissolved the House. In the elections that followed, the Patriotes, headed by Papineau, won 77 out of 88 seats with 90% of the vote. To the same demands, the Governor responded by dissolving the House once again.38

The rhetorical significance of this passage is twofold. First, it typifies the text’s constitution of a subject subjugated by Britain. Note how it confronts victory with power. In doing so, it highlights what can be presented as an inherent contradiction of “French-Canadian” as a subject position that interpellates French-Canadians both as French ethnic subjects and Canadian political subjects. Second, this passage, again typically, rearticulates this subject position: it articulates “Québécois” as a political subject battling on the terrain of parliament. In doing so, it dissolves any possible contradiction between loyalty to an (ethnic) nation and the federal state and it articulates both a site for and an object of struggle: the Quebec state apparatus and its legitimated institutions.

The White Paper offers a narrative characterized by a teleological movement towards emancipation. If the root cause of the struggle of the peuple is the natural impossibility of the peuple to exist without self-determination, control of the state machinery becomes the point of resolution of a drama that began while Québécois were still under the rule of the French king. The narrative offers sovereignty as the ultimate point that must be reached in order to attain narrative closure and liberate its subjects. The White Paper offers no alternative but for Québécois to struggle against annihilation. To offer but one example among many, the recounting of the 1837 uprising by a nationalist party known as the Patriotes and their speedy defeat makes clear that Québécois are constituted in a struggle for life itself, a struggle, furthermore, that cannot be won militarily:

After their lone victory at Saint-Denis, the Patriotes were crushed at Saint-Charles and Saint-Eustache. The repression was cruel: hundreds of Patriotes were imprisoned and twelve were hanged; here and there, farms were ablaze.39

Within the context of contemporary attempts to secure Quebec’s independence, the White Paper offers a condensed historical narrative of the peuple québécois as teleologically moving towards emancipation. The historical account of the White
Paper is decidedly presentist and rhetorical, for a society of the seventeenth century is identified with a society today: the seventeenth century colonists who termed themselves "Canadiens" are termed "Québécois"; past struggles are presented as warranting action in the present. The particular issues over which nineteenth century parliamentarians battled are rendered in ideological terms that are then applied to current battles between Quebec and Canada's Federal government. Each episode in the history moves the peuple as subject towards the Quebec Referendum on sovereignty-association. The narrative form provides a continuity across time in which the practices of the past are increasingly identified with the present day order. Thus, the British Conquest, parliamentary wrangles, and the rebellions of 1837, find their counterpart in the "imposition" of a Canadian constitution:

At the constitutional conferences of 1864 and 1866, the Quebec delegates and those of the other provinces were pursuing very different goals. Upper Canada in particular wanted a supraprovincial parliament, endowed with as many and as important powers as possible, that would have presided over the fates of the new country; Quebec, on the other hand, wanted to grant itself a responsible government, enjoying a large degree of autonomy, that would guarantee once and for all the existence and progress of the Quebec peuple—and that would have been its real government. The opposition between a centralized federalism and a decentralized confederation was already making itself felt. The first idea finally won out. Granted, Québécois acquired an autonomous responsible government, but with its autonomy limited to jurisdictions seen then as being primarily of local interest.40

The peuple québécois is presented as preceding the Canadian state. Confederation, like the Conquest, the defeat of the Patriotes, and the unification in 1849 of the predominantly English-speaking colony of Upper Canada with the predominantly French-speaking colony of Lower Canada disrupted the movement of the peuple towards the "natural" ideal of its own constitution, responsible government, and a state. The implicit presumption that political structures should provide a means for the articulation and execution of a peuple's aspirations, as connoted by the term "peuple" itself, is set in opposition to this account of Canada's formation. The government in Ottawa is not a real government. Ottawa's power is represented as illegitimate. The Quebec peuple is frustrated, denied progress and its very existence. This narrative's movement towards closure is frustrated by the English presence. The emancipation of the peuple is blocked by the pattern of conquest and resistance (narratio interrumpa). The conquerors stand against narrative teleology as well as history's grand laws.

In the rhetoric of Quebec sovereignty then, the Government of Canada does not arise from the Quebec peuple and hence disrupts the teleological flow of history that the narrative form provides. Canada is an antagonist in this life-drama of a peuple. As such, Canada must be overcome so that the tensions in the mythic narrative and in history can be resolved. The "natural" principle that peuples attain control of their future is denied because Ottawa will preside over destiny. Within the context of the repression of the Patriotes, this new order does not arise from the peuple québécois but from external constraints. Confederation is but another manifestation of the Conquest to which, in this account, the peuple never assented: Québécois never acquiesce, but always struggle within the constraints of the possible. The change heralded by Confederation was but a small gain within the British system. Confederation is not the end of the struggle, only a new battleground. On this terrain, the peuple is threatened by a political reality that denies its very being.
The White Paper, having constituted Québécois in a struggle for survival, moves them and the narrative into the present. The current constitution that the independence movement opposes is represented as forming the basis for the continued subjugation of the peuple:

The institution of the Canadian federal regime thus sanctioned, and favored as well, the hegemony of a Canada become English. It is quite natural that in such a regime the interests and aspirations of Québécois and Francophones in other provinces should take second place. In 1885, for example, all Quebec took the side of Louis Riel, who was fighting for the survival of francophone communities in the West. On the other hand, the federal government fought him and Louis Riel died on the scaffold.41

Any possibility that Confederation was advantageous for Quebec is denied. The will of the peuple, as instantiated in historical practice, is shown to be undermined in the federal regime. The White Paper describes various defeats of the will of the peuple in Confederation: Louis Riel fought for “survival” and climbed the scaffold; rights to French language education outside Quebec were denied; Québécois were forced to participate in British wars.42 The accounts form a tragic tale; the francophones in Canada including the peuple québécois are without control of their circumstances.

The narrative concludes by identifying a threat to its very existence as a narrative. Canadian Confederation would deny that Québécois exist and so would deny the very possibility of this constitutive rhetoric and so of an audience inhabiting it. As the White Paper puts it: “The very balance of the system, as the Canadian majority wants it, requires that Quebec remain a province—or perhaps a territory—among ten others, and forbids the formal and concrete recognition of a Quebec nation.”43 This version of Quebec would require a revision of the meaning of “Québécois” such that it no longer positioned its subjects as members of both a nation and state. The “Québécois” would be but the Quebec resident, who might also be a French-Canadian defined in ethnic terms. Thus, in its concluding summary exhorting Québécois to vote OUI in the Referendum on sovereignty-association, the White Paper characterizes a NON vote as constituting:

Only a brutal ending to the healthiest form of progress, one that leads an entire peuple, as naturally as an individual, to its maturity. We would simply fall back into line, remain in the state of oblivion kindly granted us by those outsiders who have been keeping a close eye on our progress. . . .

On the contrary, we believe that we are mature enough, and big enough, and strong enough, to come to terms with our destiny. Because that is what is true.44

To be constituted as a Québécois in the terms of this narrative is to be constituted such that sovereignty is not only possible, but necessary. Without sovereignty, this constitutive rhetoric would ultimately die and those it has constituted would cease to be subjects, or at least would remain, like children, partial and stunted subjects, lacking maturity, responsibility, and autonomy. In consequence, true Québécois could not vote NON. Only a OUI vote would be in harmony with their being and their collective destiny: “Indeed, the choice should be easy, for the heart as well as the mind. We need only give a little thought to how faithful we have been in the past and how strong we are at present; we must think also of those who will follow us, whose futures depend so utterly on that moment.”45

In sum, the White Paper calls on those it has addressed to follow narrative
consistency and the motives through which they are constituted as audience members. Its rhetorical effect derives from their interpellation as subjects and on their identification with a transhistorical and transindividual subject position. It is in this sense of textualizing audiences, therefore, that we can understand the process Black treats in his discussion of the second persona and McGee discusses in his study of the “people.” From this perspective, we can see that audiences do not exist outside rhetoric, merely addressed by it, but live inside rhetoric. Indeed, from the moment they enter into the world of language, they are subjects; the very moment of recognition of an address constitutes an entry into a subject position to which inheres a set of motives that render a rhetorical discourse intelligible. These subject positions are bequeathed by the past, by yesterday’s discourses. Furthermore, the contradictions between discourses as well as the dialectic between discourse and a changing concrete world open a space for new subject positions. Tensions in the realm of the symbolic render possible the rhetorical repositioning or rearticulation of subjects.

CONCLUSION

Early in this essay, I identified two problems deserving examination: the first regarding the ontological status of those addressed by discourse before their successful interpellation; the second regarding the ontological status of the persona and the process by which one is identified with it. I have treated the latter problem by introducing the concept of the subject and by showing that audiences are constituted as subjects through a process of identification with a textual position. This identification occurs through a series of ideological effects arising from the narrative structure of constitutive rhetoric. As for the first problem I posed, I have in a sense circumvented it through my analysis. Persons are subjects from the moment they acquire language and the capacity to speak and to be spoken to. As such, constitutive rhetoric is part of the discursive background of social life. It is always there, usually implicitly, and sometimes explicitly articulated. It is more than a set of commonplaces, but is the con-text, the pre-rhetoric that is necessary to any successful interpellation.

Our first subject positions are modest, linked to our name, our family, and our sex. As we enter the adult world, they become more complex, as different constitutive rhetorics reposition us with respect to such formal and informal institutions as the state, the economy, the church, and the school. Thus, though we are subjects through language, and indeed can only speak as subjects, our subjectivity and ideological commitments are not fixed at our first utterance. As Quebec public address illustrates, particular subject positions can undergo transformation: “Canadien français” can become “Québécois,” an identity permitting claims for a new political order. At particular historical moments, political rhetorics can reposition or rearticulate subjects by performing ideological work upon the texts in which social actors are inscribed.

In this essay, I have suggested that Burke’s privileging of the term “identification” and an understanding of rhetoric’s constitutive and ontological effect, as suggested by structuralist discourse theory, have certain consequences for the theory and practice of rhetoric. A theory of constitutive rhetoric leads us to call into question the concept, usually implicit to rhetoric’s humanist tradition, of an audience composed of unified and transcendent subjects. If we are left with a subject, that subject is partial and
decentered. History, and indeed discourse itself, form the ground for subjectivity. Consequently, even what Fisher terms “narrative fidelity” has an ideological character, for the experiential ground to which narratives would be faithful are always already ideologically framed within the very being of the experiencing subject.46

Because ideology forms the ground for any rhetorical situation, a theory of ideological rhetoric must be mindful not only of arguments and ideographs, but of the very nature of the subjects that rhetoric both addresses and leads to come to be. Indeed, because the constitutive nature of rhetoric establishes the boundary of a subject’s motives and experience, a truly ideological rhetoric must rework or transform subjects. A transformed ideology would require a transformed subject (not a dissolving of subjectivity). Such a transformation requires ideological and rhetorical work. This can proceed at two levels: (1) it can proceed at the level of the constitutive narrative itself, providing stories that through the identificatory principle shift and rework the subject and its motives; (2) it can also proceed at the aesthetic level of what Williams terms the “structure of feeling” and Grossberg describes as the “affective apparatus.”47 Since, as Fisher observes, the truth of a narrative resides in its “fidelity,” which is an aesthetic quality, new true narratives become possible as new modes of aesthetic experience emerge and gain social meaning. Ideological rhetorical practice is not restricted to explicitly political public address, but can include a range of aesthetic practices, including music, drama, architecture, and fashion, that elicit new modes of experience and being.

The significance of the rhetorical tradition is that it has long realized that discourse has eminently political and practical effects. In recognizing the contingency of the social, it offers the possibility of social critique and the development of praxis. However, in order to overcome the constraints of ideology, rhetorical theory must see through the ‘givenness’ of what appears to be the delimitable rhetorical situation, where the ontological status of speaker, speech, audience, topic, and occasion offer themselves as unproblematic. It must recognize that ultimately, the position one embodies as a subject is a rhetorical effect.

NOTES

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1By ideology I mean a symbolic system, the discourse of which (1) is “false” in the sense that it is based on the presuppositions of some “terministic screen,” (2) denies its historicity and linguisticity—pretending to but present a naturally or self-evidently meaningful world, (3) denies or transforms contradictions, and (4) legitimates and structures power relations. As such, my usage is much like the one suggested in, Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 165–197.


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8Quebec (Prov.), Conseil exécutif, La nouvelle entente Québec-Canada: Proposition du Gouvernement du Québec pour une entente d'égal à égal: La souveraineté-association. Quebec: 1979. This document, a soft cover book sold in bookstores, consists of a foreword, six chapters which explain the Quebec government's reasons for seeking sovereignty, and a concluding direct address by Quebec's premier, René Levesque, calling for a OUI vote in the forthcoming referendum. The significance of the document arises from its clear articulation of Quebec's rhetoric of sovereignty as it had developed for over a decade in Quebec public address, and from its institutional status, offering the official rhetoric of the government's pro-sovereignty position.
9Quebec, La nouvelle entente, 62-64.
10As adopted by the Quebec Assemblée nationale, 20 March 1980, the following question appeared on the ballot:
"Le Gouvernement du Québec a fait connaître sa proposition d'en arriver, avec le reste du Canada, à une nouvelle entente fondée sur le principe de l'égalité des peuples; cette entente permettrait au Québec d'acquérir le pouvoir exclusif de faire ses lois, de percevoir ses impôts et d'établir ses relations extérieures, ce qui est la souveraineté—et, en même temps, de maintenir avec le Canada une association économique comportant l'utilisation de la même monnaie; aucun changement de statut politique résultant de ces négociations ne sera réalisé sans l'accord de la population lors d'un autre référendum; en conséquence, accordez-vous au Gouvernement du Québec le mandat de négocier l'entente proposée entre le Québec et le Canada?

OUI

NON

The Government of Quebec has made public its proposal to negotiate a new agreement with the rest of Canada, based on the equality of nations; this agreement would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, levy its taxes and establish relations abroad—in other words, sovereignty—and at the same time, to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common currency; no change in political status resulting from these negotiations will be effected without approval by the people through another referendum; on these terms, do you give the Government of Quebec the mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada?

YES

NO."

11In the May 1980 referendum on "sovereignty-association," 85.6% of eligible voters cast valid ballots. Of these, 40.4% voted OUI. See, Rapport des résultats, 19. Among francophones, the vote was slightly higher and is estimated at 46%. See, Jean-Claude Picard, "Le gouvernement et le Parti Québécois analysent l'échec référendaire de mardi," Le Devoir, Thursday, 22 May 1980.
14Claude Morin's text was written as a reflection on his experience of federal-provincial relations as a high-ranking civil servant. He was also an early and active proponent of sovereignty and member of the PQ who became a cabinet minister in the PQ government.
15McGee, 246.
20Burke, Symbolic Action, 5.
21Burke reveals a structuralist tendency in his discussions of the formal interplay between the elements of his "pentad," which are constitutive of motives. While Burke differs with the French structuralist tradition, particularly in holding on to the concept of "act," his denial of a foundational character for any of his pentadic terms and his sensitivity to unresolved ambiguities é©le him, just like the French structuralists, to consider the agent's constitution in symbolic structures. See Frank Lentricchia, Criticism and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 66-83.
22"Interpellée" is a rather commonly used French verb which designates the act of calling upon someone by name and demanding an answer. It is not surprising that Althusser, in the quote that follows, uses the example of a policeman's hailing, since a person who is interpellé is usually under some constraint to respond. Thus, the term is used to refer to the questioning of ministers by members of parliament and to the formal address of a judge or bailiff as part of a legal act. Petit Larousse illustré, 1979, s. v. "interpellée," "interpellation."
23Althusser, 174.
24McGee, 244.
Quaker, Rhetoric of Motives, 194.

Québec, La nouvelle entente, 3. The primary language of Quebec public discourse is French. As such, political life proceeds through a French "terministic screen." To be true to the political consciousness of that society, this essay is based on the analysis of the French primary texts. It is for this reason that I continue to use the terms "people" and "Québécois" throughout this essay. Note specifically that "people," the French term for "people" is a singular noun; in French, one would write "the people is." Note also that there is no adequate translation of "Québécois." The closest equivalent, "Quebecker," lacks all of the French term's nationalist connotations. While analyzed in French, cited passages are presented in English translation for the reader's convenience. My translation is in large measure based on the simultaneously published official English version of the White Paper: Québec-Canada a New Deal: The Québec Government Proposal for a New Partnership between Equals: Sovereignty-Association (Quebec: 1979).


Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, 197.

Québec, La nouvelle entente, 3-4.


Fisher, 6.

McGee and Althusser adopt a similar strategy in order to assert the materiality of meaning. Althusser argues that, "Ideology... prescribes material practices governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject in all consciousness according to his belief" (Althusser, 170). Similarly, McGee, after tracing out the relationship of myth to ideology, asserts: "Though [myths] technically represent 'false consciousness,' they nonetheless function as a means of providing social unity and collective unity. Indeed, 'the people' are the social and political myths they accept" (McGee, 247).

Québec, La nouvelle entente, 5.

Québec, La nouvelle entente, 6.

Québec, La nouvelle entente, 7-8.

Québec, La nouvelle entente, 11.

Québec, La nouvelle entente, 11-12.

Québec, La nouvelle entente, 44-45.

Québec, La nouvelle entente, 109-110.

Québec, La nouvelle entente, 118.

Fisher, 8.
